Natural Science Forum / Physics / General Physics / December 2008

The so-called 'counterintuitive' is a severely problematic
feature in modern physics. It can be used, merely on the
prompting of some mathematical formula, without the
application of any other principle that might control and
validate its use.

In some circumstances, the counterintuitive can be a
useful tool to correct the deficiencies of common sense,
or even an inadequate philosophical outlook. In the case
of Einstein's train experiment, for example, commom
sense would suggest that it is the train that is moving
through the countryside, rather than the countryside
moving around the stationary train. The principle of
relativity, however, points out that there is no law of
physics that  works any differently in the countryside to
the way it works in the train, such that the countryside
observer could declare it to be 'correct' that it is the train
that is moving in the countryside. Common sense can,
indeed, be tutored, and improved, by such counterintuitivity.

One can, as it were, 'hypnotise' oneself, as a passenger
on a train, into forming a perception of the train being
stationary, with the countryside moving past it, rather than
the other way around, with both views being equally
thinkable. A dramatic example of relativity can be a direct
experience if you are sitting at the window of a carriage,
in a station, beside the carriage of another train, on the
other track, also stationary. If your train begins to move
relative to the other train, you may, on passing the end of
the other train, see, to your surprise, that you are still
stationary, and that it was really the other train that was
moving. Next time it happens, if you remember, you will
have no way of telling which train is moving relative to the
station (assuming the acceleration of your train is usually
imperceptibly smooth), until you can see something in the
station itself. That is, you can see only the relative motion
between yourself and the other train, so that, if you can
suppose the other train to be moving, a passenger
in the other train can equally suppose that you are moving,
no matter which of you is not moving relative to the station.

However, in the solution to the nonsimultaneity problem
posed by the train experiment, it is proposed that time itself
is frame dependent. This leads to the end of the concept
of universal time for all observers. This, in turn, casts doubt
on the philosophical concepts of 'now' and the 'co-existence'
of all things. The question is: does this counterintuitivity tutor
the mind in any improved philosophical understanding that
can replace that which already exists? Unlike with the former
example, in this case I would say not. Instead, the
counterintuitivity is proposed, with the philosophical
implications being simply left unanswered.

I say that this is unsatisfactory, and is of no service to
physics, or to the human understanding in general.
Therefore, I believe that, to be valid, any counterintuitivity
proposed, for example, by a mathematical equation, should
be required to be such as to replace the 'intuition', or
philosophical understanding, that exists, with something
that is a rationally understandable improvement. If this is
lacking, any counterintuitive theory will replace any rational
component of intuition with sheer mystification, rather than
reason, and should therefore be regarded as defective,
until such time as the defect is removed with an explanation
that is more rational than the original intuition. If this is
intrinsically impossible then, I would say, the counterintuitive
theory should be reexamined on the supposition that the
counterintuitivity itself is, in this case, a sign that the theory
can be replaced with an alternative that will provide
a rational explanation. I would argue a general postulate that
mystification is never an intrinsic property of the relationship
between reality and mind as such.

Alen